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Abstract
In a world awash in statistical patterns, should we conclude that the universe’s evolution or
genesis is somehow subject to chance? I draw attention to alternatives that must be
acknowledged if we are to have an adequate assessment of what chance the universe might
have had.
1 Cosmology and Chance
Although cosmology, the study of the universe’s evolution, has largely become a settled
province of empirically-grounded physics, the more distant shores of cosmogony, the study of
the origin of the universe, continue to fascinate the speculative imaginations of physicists and
philosophers alike. Of course, many people believe that science has settled questions about the
origin of the universe too, at least on a popular understanding of the well-known and
well-confirmed big bang model of the universe, for, as the popular imagination has it, the
universe itself began with an event, the eponymous “big bang.” Putting it this way is not quite
right however. As the general theory of relativity has it, there was no such first event; rather,
what the big bang universe has is a “past singularity,” and a singularity is a global property of
spacetime, not some actual event in spacetime. That the big bang universe is singular does,
however, entail that any observer’s temporal past is finite—but, nevertheless, despite having a
finite age, it does not have a first moment (just as there is no first positive real number).
At very early times the big bang universe evolved through a sequence of extremely hot,
dense states (decreasing in temperature and density with increasing time). Cosmologists often
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understand this sequence of initial hot, dense states as the apt referent of the term “big bang.”
On this characterization, the big bang is not thought of as the beginning but instead as a very
early stage of the universe’s evolution, in which case the big bang falls properly within
cosmology, not cosmogony, since it concerns the evolution of the universe. One reason to
follow the cosmologists’ interpretation is that, while our physical evidence indicates that we
may be highly confident that the big bang account is correct back to a very early time, it
becomes progressively less compelling as we go farther and farther back in time. At three
minutes it is nigh incontrovertible; but earlier, say one second, the story becomes fairly
dubious, due to uncertainty about the physics involved. In using “big bang” in this way,
cosmologists therefore avoid committing themselves to a particular cosmogonical story while
still being able to maintain that the big bang’s cosmological account is largely correct.
Of course, those so inclined may also thereby find time enough to encourage speculations
about the origin of the universe.1 Indeed, philosophers and physicists have seized the
opportunity afforded by this window of uncertainty to make substantive explanatory posits,
especially with an eye towards explaining the statistical patterns we observe in the world.
Perhaps most conspicuous is the supposition that the universe began in a low entropy state
(Penrose, 1989; Albert, 2000; Wald, 2006; Carroll, 2010; Feynman, 2017). According to
statistical mechanics, this means assigning an appropriate probability measure to the time
associated with this state. Now, since this measure must be objective in order for it to do the
explanatory and descriptive work of statistical mechanics, it evidently needs to be grounded in
objective features of the world. While there are various proposals for substantiating the
objectivity of physical probabilities, the most metaphysically-inclined will take the
straightforward road of grounding probability assignments of this state ontically (Loewer,
2004; Demarest, 2016), which is to say, to take them to be chances (Briggs, 2010).
Should we say that the universe had a chance then? Drawing on my previous work (McCoy,
2018a, b, forthcoming a, b, c), I suggest that the answer is not at all clear yet. Many authors
promote their views in the context of limited alternatives, but the possibilities are far larger than
it might seem from the literature. I focus here on two contrast classes to the question that must
be recognized: first, concerning determinism and indeterminism, and, second, concerning
different implementations of chances in an indeterministic theory.
1Were there previous stages to the universe, before the big bang? What actually brought the universe into
existence? What was the character of the initial happening (should it in fact truly exist)? See (Callender and
McCoy, forthcoming) for a survey of some current thinking on questions like these, related to time and the origin
of the universe.
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2 Some Metaphysical Preliminaries
By the world metaphysicians generally mean something like “the maximally inclusive entity
whose parts are all the things that exist.” Terminology does vary, of course. This particular
rendering comes from Schaffer (2010, 33), who prefers to call this entity the cosmos. As it
happens, cosmologists do not usually call their object of study the cosmos; more commonly
they say that they study the universe. They seldom have much to say about how the universe
which they study relates to the more “worldly” concerns of the metaphysician. There are
occasional exceptions however. Harrison provides a notable one with his text Cosmology: The
Science of the Universe, in which he discusses the philosophical and historical dimensions of
cosmology (and cosmogony) alongside the more standard material of physical cosmology.
What metaphysicians call the world Harrison designates the Universe. The cosmology of
scientific cosmologists, according to Harrison, is the study of universes: scientific models of
the Universe (Harrison, 2000, Ch. 1), which are used to describe especially its large-scale
structure and the evolution thereof.
This is a practically useful distinction to make, one which I will adopt in the following. By
the world I intend, following the practice of metaphysicians, the locus of (principally)
metaphysical questions (concerning what Harrison calls the Universe): Is the world
deterministic? Is it chancy? These are the kinds of questions primarily at issue in this paper. By
the universe I designate, following the practice of cosmologists, the locus of principally
physical questions concerning what Harrison calls the Universe: How did the Universe begin?
How will it end? These latter are questions to which a cosmological model, like the big bang
model, should suggest or indicate some answer.
I do not mean, of course, to introduce any sharp distinction between science and
metaphysics by differentiating universe and world. Indeed, when one asks whether the world
has some feature, naturalistic-minded metaphysicians of science look first to scientific models
of the Universe to help decide the question. For instance, when addressing the question
whether the world is deterministic, Wu¨thrich claims that “this metaphysical question deflates
into the question of whether our best physical theories entail that the world is deterministic or
indeterministic” (Wu¨thrich, 2011, 366).
Naturalistic discussions of determinism generally adopt the approach favored by Wu¨thrich,
and so will I. Let determinism stand for the thesis that the world is deterministic. Then,
following (Lewis, 1983, 360), a world is deterministic just when the laws of that world are
deterministic. To determine whether the laws of the universe are deterministic, we must look to
our theories of which those laws are part and ask whether those laws (taken together) should be
considered deterministic. It is by no means a straightforward matter to decide whether a given
physical theory is deterministic. Even the classic example of deterministic physics, Newtonian
mechanics, appears to admit of many indeterministic counterexamples to its purported
determinism (Earman, 1986; Norton, 2008). General relativity too permits indeterministic
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behavior in the form of causal pathologies (closed timelike curves) and, if the hole argument is
to be believed, is hopelessly rife with indeterminism (Earman and Norton, 1987).
If one excludes outlandish counterexamples and interpretations, however, then one might
reasonably regard both theories as essentially deterministic, at least for all practical purposes.
As standard cosmological models, such as the big bang universe, are models of the general
theory of relativity (our best theory of the universe, at least at large scales), it would then follow
that our universe is deterministic, in which case it seems that physical cosmology tells us
unequivocally that the universe never had a chance (McCoy, 2018a). Following the exhortation
of naturalistic metaphysicians to answer metaphysical questions by looking to our best physical
theories, we may then come to the conclusion that the world too is not at all chancy.
Certainly, general relativity is not our best theory all physical phenomena considered.
Indeed, our best theories in many contexts are probabilistic theories, like quantum mechanics
and statistical mechanics. These theories, one might expect, are indeterministic through and
through, because of the probabilistic element. Various interpreters of these probabilistic
theories seek to evade any seemingly inherent indeterminism, however, by characterizing
probabilities as merely epistemic or subjective (which approaches I will be mostly setting aside
here for reasons of space) or else by attempting to portray them as fully deterministic theories
(as in the Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics) (Sklar, 1993; von Plato, 1994;
Guttmann, 1999; Bricmont et al., 2001; Beisbart and Hartmann, 2011; Ben-Menahem and
Hemmo, 2012).
Philosophers have raised serious concerns, though, over how one can truly understand
probabilities in deterministic theories that seem to depend on them for their empirical content,
an issue that has been termed the “paradox of deterministic probabilities” (Loewer, 2001;
Winsberg, 2008; Lyon, 2011) in statistical mechanics. The objectivity of these probabilities
must be derived from some objective ground. One possibility, the one with which I am
principally concerned in this paper, is that they are directly grounded in some element of
randomness in the nature of things, that is, they are genuine chances. Lewis insisted that
deterministic chances, at least, are incoherent: “to the question of how chance can be
reconciled with determinism, or to the question of how disparate chances can be reconciled
with one another, my answer is: it can’t be done” (Lewis, 1986, 118). He was surely right
about this. The basic problem is that the world cannot both be chancy and deterministic, for the
ontic character of these probabilities simply entails indeterminism, the contrary of determinism
(McCoy, forthcoming c, §1).
Several authors have nevertheless offered accounts of “deterministic chance” in order to
resolve the aforementioned paradox (Glynn, 2010; Eagle, 2011; Lyon, 2011; Briggs, 2015;
Emery, 2015). These either run afoul of the problem just mentioned or are not really accounts
of deterministic chance (but rather characterize some kind of merely epistemic probability)
(McCoy, forthcoming c, §2). As far as I can see, there is only one successful reconciliation of
chance and determinism, namely that defended by Loewer (2001) in the context of statistical
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mechanics. It is seldom recognized by interpreters, however, that there is no reconciliation in
the sense of a simultaneous compatibility of chance and determinism in Loewer’s
account—that is not possible, just as Lewis says.
Instead, Loewer’s account shows us how deterministic laws can co-exist with
indeterministic laws within a theory. The source of all probabilities in statistical mechanics,
according to Loewer, is in an initial chance distribution over microscopic states of affairs. After
the initial time these states of affairs evolve deterministically. Crucially, although for almost all
times evolution is deterministic in Loewer’s account, it is not so for all times. There is, in
effect, an initial chance event, which is where the indeterminism of the theory appears. Recall
that a deterministic theory is a theory whose laws are deterministic, not a theory whose laws
are mostly deterministic or operate deterministically for almost all times. Thus, Loewer’s
account does not attempt to confute the metaphysical conflict of chance and determinism
(McCoy, forthcoming c, §3). Rather, it finds a way to harmonize both aspects in a single world.
Loewer is a Humean, though, and does not believe that the chances and laws of
probabilistic theories exist independently of categorical events or facts (Loewer, 1996).
According to the Humean (of Loewer’s stripe), they are consequences of the best
systematizations of the occurrent facts, as maintained in Lewis’s “best systems account” of
laws and chances (and variations thereof) (Loewer, 2004). Humean chances are thus
ontologically reducible. Demarest offers a non-reductionist tweak to Loewer’s account by
invoking a “robustly metaphysical account of chance” (Demarest, 2016, 256) in the face of
Loewer’s reductionism. She claims that such chances are compatible with determinism, and
indeed they are when compatibility is rendered as the mere co-existence of indeterministic and
deterministic laws in a single theory (which cannot, of course, operate at the same time).
Despite their differences, they both regard the objective probabilities of physics as ontic
probabilities—in other words, as chances, not as merely epistemic probabilities (Winsberg,
2008; McCoy, forthcoming c). Thus, Loewer’s and Demarest’s accounts, of initial chances in
otherwise deterministic universes, have the consequence that worlds to which these accounts
apply had a chance.2
3 Did the Universe Really Have a Chance?
Loewer’s and Demarest’s apparently consistent interpretations of statistical physics can be read
to suggest that the universe had a single, initial chance. Is it so? To clarify the standing of any
such claim about chanciness in the world, I will draw attention in this section to two important
and salient contrast classes which can be associated with the general question, “did the universe
2Did our world have a chance? Although statistical mechanics is not a candidate for a fundamental theory of
the universe, quantum mechanics is, so if one of their accounts is right, then, happily, we could say that our world
had a chance after all.
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have a chance?” In the metaphysical preliminaries of the previous section, these contexts were
already implicitly introduced. The first is whether the cosmological theory is deterministic or
indeterministic.3 The second is whether the probabilities of an indeterministic cosmological
theory are probabilities of initial conditions or of the dynamics.4
3.1 Determinism and Indeterminism
A primary motivation for Loewer and Demarest is to give a philosophical undergirding for
statistical physics explanations of statistical patterns in the world. When we ask whether the
world had a chance, however, our concern goes beyond the ontological possibilities of
statistical physics, even granting our naturalistic method, to all (physically) viable ontological
possibilities. For this reason we should wonder whether statistical patterns in empirical data by
themselves provide good evidence for indeterministic (specifically, probabilistic) theories
rather than deterministic theories. If a deterministic theory can ground these patterns, then it
may be nothing other than a pragmatic preference that leads us to favor (ostensibly
indeterministic) statistical physics explanations.
Certain statistical patterns do indeed appear to favor a deterministic explanation and some
an indeterministic one. Consider the following example: the pattern of bombings in London on
the first day of the Blitz during World War 2.5 The clustering of the bombings around certain
locations strongly suggests a primarily causal explanation, namely that the Luftwaffe pilots
were aiming at specific targets and their bombs roughly landed near where they aimed.
Consider next a related example: the pattern of V2 rocket strikes around London late in the
war.6 Here the pattern looks distinctively random, and indeed V2 rockets were notoriously
unreliable in a way that suggests a dominant element of randomness involved in the associated
explanation of the pattern. Of course, looks can be deceiving: there may well be a perfectly
deterministic underlying description of this pattern when one inquires further into the
details—say, into the particular environmental conditions and rocket parts.7
Even in the context of physical theories, where we can be more precise about the issue of
determinism, it is far from clear that statistical patterns tell us unequivocally how they should
be described (and explained) theoretically. As Werndl (2009) shows, building on the claims of
(Suppes, 1993), there is a demonstrable observational equivalence of indeterministic theories
and deterministic theories for the same set of observations (i.e., statistical patterns).
Specifically, she shows that for any stochastic system there is an observationally equivalent
deterministic system and vice versa. That is, there is an underdetermination by empirical
3See, for example,(Suppes, 1993; Werndl, 2009, 2013; Wu¨thrich, 2011; Hoefer, 2016).
4See, for example, (Maudlin, 2007, 2011; Wu¨thrich, 2011).
5See http://bombsight.org/#12/51.5049/-0.0896
6See https://www.wrsonline.co.uk/big-ben-rocket-strikes/1944-v2-rocket-attacks-map/
7See (Pynchon, 1973) for an alternative deterministic account of the V2 rocket strike pattern.
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evidence at the level of theory, which undermines a conclusion for or against chancy,
indeterministic behavior in the world on the basis of empirical evidence.
Such theoretical underdetermination by empirical evidence will not be terribly surprising to
anyone acquainted with the philosophy of science literature. So is there perhaps other grounds
to which we may appeal? For example, if we widen our scope of evidence to include
explanatory considerations, do we then have reason to favor deterministic or indeterministic
theories? Werndl (2013) claims that we do. She argues that indirect evidence can break the
underdetermination, since a theory that gives a unified description of a collection of models is
preferable to one that does not. Although she does not portray her argument as an inference to
the best explanation, it is a natural interpretation, for what makes a unifying theory preferable
is, intuitively, that it gives a better explanation than one that does not. Of course, we can
continue the debate whether unification is a legitimate epistemic justification or is merely a
pragmatic one. That is too large a debate to venture into here. But it does appear that there is a
significant burden on the unificationist to defend this as adequate grounds, for, to put the point
briefly, there must be a strong connection between unification and truth for it to count as
epistemically justifying in general, yet it is difficult to see what this connection could be (much
as it is difficult to see what connection there could be between simplicity and truth).
Admittedly, this is only one way in which explanatory considerations might be thought to
bear on the determinism question. And while I am pessimistic that any universal scheme can
succeed, I do believe that explanatory considerations are epistemically justifying in certain
contexts (as I argue in (McCoy, forthcoming b)). If that is right, then we can and do have
adequate epistemic grounds to favor particular theories. Nevertheless, to be fully successful,
any such argument would have to rule out, or make relatively implausible, any alternative. And
unfortunately, philosophers who attempt to draw a metaphysical conclusion on the basis of
some particular theory have done little to demonstrate that this underdetermination is
sufficiently limited to secure it.
3.2 Implementations of Chance
A second contrast to consider concerns how chances are implemented in a probabilistic
physical theory, namely as initial chances or dynamical chances. This is a context class that is
emphasized by, among others, (Maudlin, 2011; Wu¨thrich, 2011), taking as a model the idea that
dynamical theories explain via two things: laws of evolution and initial conditions (Hempel,
1965). So, on the one hand, probabilities may all have their source in initial chances, as in the
accounts of Loewer and Demarest described above, while having an otherwise deterministic
dynamics; on the other hand, probabilities may by dynamical, in the sense that the laws of
evolution are probabilistic laws, specifying only probabilities for state transitions. As intuitive
as such a characterization may be, however, it is misleading in at least a couple of ways.
This becomes clear when one realizes that there are many ways to implement chances in a
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physical theory. All one must do, as (Loewer, 2001) shows us by example, is neatly separate
when the indeterministic laws are operative and when the deterministic laws (if any) are
operative. Loewer chooses to locate all the indeterminism in one particular place—the initial
time—but one could equally locate it at another time, at many times, at all times, or even at no
time at all (outside of time, as it were).
Now, the initial time may seem particularly privileged as a time for locating a single chance
event. But why? In the case where the world is otherwise deterministic, locating the chance
event at any time whatsoever will determine the world’s history completely. So, as far as
determination goes, there is nothing special about initial chances. Something else, then, is
required in order to favor the initial time. The most intuitive is to say that there is an arrow of
time in accord with which the laws are causal, productive, or governing. Maybe in this case
only the initial time is an acceptable time to locate a chance event. However, even granting that,
it should be clear that there even being an initial time is a rather special case. If the universe
were temporally finite to the past but lacked an initial time, as in the big bang universe, then
locating the chance event at the “initial time” is not possible. Locating it at any time near to the
“beginning” would be just as arbitrary as locating it at any time whatsoever. Similarly, if the
universe is past infinite, then locating the chance event at any time whatsoever is completely
arbitrary.
To avoid this kind of unpalatable arbitrariness, one might suggest locating the chance event
“outside of time.” That is, rather than locating a chance event at some definite time, one takes
the chanciness of the world to concern the realization of a particular, complete deterministic
history from a collection of more or less probable possible histories. In opting for this
interpretation one might even truly say that the universe never had a chance, since the “chance
event” is not “in” the universe. Then again, one should probably not attach too much to there
being no literal chances in the universe in this case, for the realization of a particular
deterministic history is also precisely what the initial chance account achieves (as the
deterministic evolution of the system guarantees a bijection between initial conditions and
complete histories).
In any case, any of these “single chance” interpretations invites the oft-invoked (in
cosmology) picture of the (blind and unskilled) Creator throwing a dart (Wald, 2006, 396) or
pointing a pin (Penrose, 1989, 442) at the set of possible universes, thereby picking out the
initial conditions of the universe. The message behind drawing such pictures is often that such
an interpretation is purely metaphysical (in a pejorative sense). Whether this is cause for
concern or not, drawing together all of a theory’s indeterminism into a single random trial is
not the only option. As said, chancy behavior could be inherent in the dynamics instead; that is,
the theory’s dynamics is stochastic. There are various examples of implementing chances in
this way in the foundations of quantum mechanics (Ghirardi, 2016): indeterministic behavior
can happen, for example, at discrete times, as in the GRW interpretation, or continuously, as in
the CSL interpretation. Other examples arise in classical statistical mechanics, especially
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non-equilibrium statistical mechanics (Wallace, 2014; Luczak, 2016; McCoy, 2018b).
There is, however, a third way to implement chances in a physical theory: implementing the
chancy behavior in the observable properties of a system, as I have recently suggested (McCoy,
forthcoming a). In the aforementioned “stochastic dynamics” approach the indeterminism of
the theory is an indeterminism of states—state transitions are indeterministic—whereas the
observable properties of a system are fully determined by the state. The alternative “stochastic
observables” approach, by contrast, maintains a deterministic state dynamics and instead
implements indeterminism in the observable outcomes—which observable outcome is realized
is a matter of chance.
One might categorize the stochastic observables interpretation as a species of dynamical
chance, saying, for example, that there is no physical difference between indeterministic state
evolution and indeterministic realization of observables. Perhaps that is right. But if that is
right, then with at least equal reason one ought to count “initial” chances as dynamical chances,
since they involve an indeterministic dynamical transition at some time (for example, an initial
time). Do we recognize a single category of chance then? Two? Three? At the very least, it is
not so clear that the division of chances into initial conditions and dynamical laws is so apt. At
the very least, there are manifold possibilities that should be recognized for implementing
chances in a physical theory.
4 Conclusion
Although I began with a discussion of some aspects of cosmology which motivate the idea that
the universe had a single chance, almost all discussion of physical cosmology has long since
dropped out of consideration. Indeed, by now it should be clear that contemporary physical
cosmology is little relevant to this idea and issue. Although the conceptual opaqueness of
probability is a match for the opaqueness of the beginning of our universe, this is surely not a
sufficient reason to locate chances there. Whatever genuine reasons interpreters of statistical
physics actually have, I have argued that it is important to recognize a variety of coherent ways
to implement chances in a probabilistic physical theory—it is not just a choice between initial
chances and stochastic dynamics. Moreover, although in all of these chance implementations
we may say that the universe (so interpreted) is chancy, we must also acknowledge alternatives
at higher levels of interpretation. In particular, we must acknowledge that there may be
unconceived deterministic alternatives to our indeterministic probabilistic physical theories—at
least until these can be clearly ruled out.
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